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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
ALFRED LEE O'NEIL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920439-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Alfred Lee O'Neil appeals his conviction on 
three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, 
first degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a) and -(l)(b) (Supp. 1992). This Court has jurisdiction by 
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), whereby an 
appeal from a first degree felony conviction may be transferred 
to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
transferred this case by order dated July 9, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court Properly Admit Evidence of 
Defendant's "Other Bad Acts,19 Under Rules 404, 403, and 609, Utah 
Rules of Evidence? Admissibility of evidence under Rule 404 
appears to present a question of law, reviewed without deference 
to the trial court. See State v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 568-71 
(Utah App. 1991). Rules 403 and 609 both require the trial court 
to weigh probative value against the prejudicial effect of 
evidence; thus the State agrees with defendant that appellate Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
review of this process entails a deferential, "abuse of 
discretion" standard. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232f 239 
(Utah 1992) (Rule 403); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-96 
(Utah App. 1990). Cf:. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 
(Utah 1991) ("Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a 
question of law, and we always review questions of law under a 
correctness standard"). 
2. Where the Evidence of Defendant's Prior Conviction 
was Excluded at his First Trial, which Ended in a Mistrial, Did 
the Trial Court, with a Different Judge Presiding, Properly Admit 
that Evidence at Defendant's Second Trial? This issue 
essentially addresses the authority of one district judge to set 
aside the "law of the case" decided by another. As set forth 
more fully in the body of this brief, this should be considered a 
matter of trial court discretion, and be afforded deference on 
appeal. See, e.g., Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 
692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) ("law of the case" doctrxne is 
subject to several exceptions). 
3. Did the Trial Court Correctly Deny Defendant's 
Motion, at His Second Trial, to Recuse the Trial Judge and 
Replace Him with the Judge who had Presided over the First Trial? 
The denial of a recusal motion is reversed on appeal only upon a 
showing of actual bias, or if the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988); State v. Ontiveros, 189 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. June 22, 1992). 
2 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident• 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in 
pertinent part: 
General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant . . .. 
The text of other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
pertinent to this appeal will appear in the body of this brief. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was first tried jointly with his wife, Peggy 
O'Neil, on three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance (R. 98). The counts were based upon three December 
1990 methamphetamine sales directly consummated by Peggy O'Neil; 
defendant was charged as an accomplice, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-202 (1990) (R. 5-8). Peggy O'Neil was found guilty; however, 
the jury deadlocked as to defendant, resulting in a mistrial 
ruling on the charges against him (R. 103-04). 
A new trial was set for defendant alone (R. 139). The 
State moved in limine to admit evidence of defendant's and Peggy 
O'Neil's prior, 1987 convictions on similar charges, along with 
evidence that defendant had been incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison on such charges from 1987 through 1990. This evidence had 
been excluded, on defendant's motion, at the original joint trial 
(R. 99, 121). The judge in the new trial, not the same judge who 
had presided over the joint trial, granted the State's motion to 
admit the evidence (R. 159-60). This pretrial success prompted 
the State to press forward with the new trial (R. 105). 
The new trial resulted in guilty verdicts on all three 
distribution counts (R. 291-93). By virtue of defendant's prior 
conviction, these verdicts amounted to first degree felonies 
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a) and -(l)(b) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence supporting defendant's guilt is fairly 
straightforward. A confidential informant, P.H., made three 
4 
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controlled methamphetamine buys from Peggy O'Neil inside Woody's 
Bar in Moab, during early December 1990 (T. 2/27/92 at 67, 71-72, 
101; 75-78; 81-85; 185-86). Twice, defendant was actually inside 
Woody's, watching P.H. "very closely" as the sales were completed 
(id. at 78, 83). P.H. was convinced that defendant actually saw 
the exchange of drugs for money during one of the buys (.id. at 
124-25, 127). Defendant was also positively identified driving 
Peggy O'Neil to or from Woody'8 in his brown Thunderbird at the 
time of two of the sales (id. at 71, 148-49, 153). The 
Thunderbird was in the vicinity on all three occasions (id., and 
id. at 181, observing male driver and female passenger). 
P.H. admitted that a month or so after the controlled 
buys, he began buying methamphetamine for his own personal use 
(T. 2/27/92 at 102). He made one such purchase on credit from 
Peggy O'Neil; shortly thereafter, P.H. testified, defendant 
attempted to collect that debt for his wife, telling P.H. to pay 
for the methamphetamine as soon as possible (id. at 103-05). 
As permitted upon its pretrial motion in limine, the 
State introduced evidence of defendant's 1987 conviction and 
incarceration for drug distribution (T. 2/28/92 at 252-55). 
Peggy O'Neil's concurrent 1987 conviction, and the fact that she 
had been charged jointly with defendant in that case, was also 
revealed (id..; State's Exh. H, at Attachment A to Record on 
Appeal). This showed defendant's awareness of, and involvement 
in, his wife's past criminal activity, supporting the State's 
argument that defendant had intentionally aided her in the 
5 
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December 1990 methamphetamine sales (T. 2/28/92 at 280-81)• The 
jury was also urged that defendant's presence in Woody's bar 
during two of those sales, and his effort to collect the drug 
debt from P.H., belied his testimony that he had been an 
unwitting bystander to Peggy O'Neil's crimes (id. at 282-84). 
The jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts (T. 2/28/92 
at 310-11). Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent, five-
to-life terms at the Utah State Prison (R. 309). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Evidence of defendant's prior conviction was properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. This Court, 
the Utah Supreme Court, and the clear weight of authority all 
hold that such evidence is admissible where, as here, it is used 
to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake with respect to 
the charges at hand. The trial court also properly found that 
under Rule 403, the probative value of the evidence was not 
"substantially outweighed" by opposing concerns. And although 
defendant's past conviction was not primarily admitted to impeach 
his credibility, it did fall within the time guidelines to make 
such use permissible, and again, it was sufficiently probative to 
outweigh concerns about unfair prejudice. 
The judge at defendant's second trial was not bound by 
the first trial judge's order ruling defendant's prior conviction 
inadmissible. Defendant relies too heavily on his "law of the 
case" argument; that doctrine has legitimate exceptions, and is 
not compelling here. Because this was defendant's second trial, 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the inadmissibility ruling at the first trial was not binding; 
further, different considerations at the two trials justified the 
different evidentiary rulings. Reconsideration of evidentiary 
rulings, as happened here, should always be permissible, for it 
allows trial courts to correct their own errors. 
It appears that defendant's "judge substitution" 
complaint is merely his evidentiary ruling complaint in a 
different guise. He did not properly pursue his request to 
change judges in his second trial, for he did not follow the 
procedures set forth in Rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, for judge recusal. He makes no showing that the 
presiding district court judge exceeded his authority to assign 
cases as deemed fit in light of judge workloads. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S AND HIS WIFE'S PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS AND OTHER BAD ACTS WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT DEFENDANT'S SECOND TRIAL. 
Defendant first complains that evidence of prior 
convictions, and evidence that he demanded payment of informant 
P.H.'s drug debt after the charged offenses took place, was 
improperly admitted against him. These complaints fail. 
A. Proper Admission of Prior Convictions. 
Admissibility of defendant's and his wife's prior 
convictions was competently addressed in both parties' memoranda 
to the trial court (R. 106-37). The State spelled out that it 
wished to use the prior convictions, as permitted by Rule 404(b), 
7 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, for the purpose of showing defendant's 
knowledge of his wife's drug dealing and, in turn, knowledge that 
his wife went to Woody's bar intending to sell illicit drugs (R. 
110). The State also argued that the prior convictions showed a 
common scheme to the December 1990 offenses, that is, that 
defendant and his wife acted together (R. 112-13).l 
These were proper bases for admission of the evidence. 
Such "other crimes" evidence is admissible for purposes not 
related to the accused's character, "such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). This 
portion of Rule 404 is an "inclusionary" rule, that admits "all 
evidence of other crimes relevant to an issue at trial except 
that evidence that proves only criminal disposition." State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added), 
following State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989), 
and State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). 
In Tanner. the Utah Supreme Court traced the 
development of Rule 404(b) (then Rule 55), and noted that the 
rule's construction as one of inclusion dates back to 1947. 675 
P.2d at 546 (citing State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016 
(1947)). In Taylor, this Court noted the overwhelming approval 
of "other crimes" evidence both generally and, as here, in drug 
prosecutions, 818 P.2d at 569-570 (citing authorities). Here, 
*The State also believed that the prior offense had taken 
place at Woody's bar (R. 113); however, at trial, defendant denied 
this (T. 2/28/92 at 253). 
8 
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the evidence was relevant to defendant's knowledge and intent as 
an accomplice to drug dealing; it did not show "only" criminal 
disposition. Thus the trial court, relying on Tavlor (R. 138), 
correctly admitted it under Rule 404. 
This Court held in Tavlor that Rule 404 alone may not 
compel admission of "other crimes" evidence, and that the 
"probative versus prejudicial" weighing of Rule 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence should also be done, 818 P.2d at 571. Defendant, 
however, misconstrues Rule 403, arguing that it compels exclusion 
of relevant evidence upon a mere "likelihood that it will be 
unfairly prejudicial" (Br. of Appellant at 5). In Tavlor, this 
Court held that to be excluded under Rule 403, the probative 
value of the challenged, relevant evidence must be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, 818 
P.2d at 571 (quoting the rule, emphasis partly in original). 
Here the trial court ruled that evidence of the past 
convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice (R. 156). As a matter of trial court 
discretion, this ruling should be honored on appeal. See State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). The ruling is not 
"beyond the limits of reasonability," jld. Therefore, this Court 
should affirm it even if it might have ruled differently, had it 
been presiding over the actual trial.2 
2It is worth noting that under Rule 403, the trial court 
rejected other evidence proffered by the State. That evidence was 
defendant's possession of valuable "collectibles" and electronic 
equipment in his home, even though he did not seem to have much 
income. The trial court ruled that this information tended to 
9 
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Further, in Taylor, this Court noted that Rule 403 
weighing may consider the State's need for the challenged 
evidence, 818 P.2d at 571. Here such need was demonstrated by 
the inability of the first trial jury to reach a verdict on 
defendant. His guilt turned on accomplice liability, and thus, 
in turn, upon whether he intentionally aided his wife in the 
illegal transactions, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990). The 
first jury evidently deadlocked on this question, even though it 
presumably heard about defendant's close proximity during the 
methamphetamine sales in Woody's bar. This shows that evidence 
of defendant's and his wife's other similar activities was needed 
and admissible under Rule 403. 
While not seriously pursued on appeal, defendant also 
argued in the trial court that his prior, 1987 convictions were 
irrelevant to the alleged 1990 drug transactions (R. 126). 
However, defendant was incarcerated for the 1987 offenses until 
shortly before the December 1990 drug sales (T. 2/28/92 at 254-
55). Thus, but for his incarceration, it seems that defendant's 
involvement in illegal drug sales was effectively continuous, 
such that the similar 1987 offense was relevant to the question 
of his involvement in the 1990 offense. 
Defendant also complains that the prior convictions 
were inadmissible under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. That 
rule allows admission of past convictions, subject to certain 
restrictions, to impeach a witness's credibility. The State 
confuse the case with collateral issues (T. 2/27/92 at 96-97). 
10 
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cited the rule as an alternative basis for admitting the prior 
convictions, but the trial court relied solely on Rules 404 and 
403 in admitting them (R. 115, 157). 
This Court should hold that admissibility of the prior 
convictions was controlled by Rules 404 and 403, without reaching 
the Rule 609 impeachment question. Indeed, in State v. Morrell, 
803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990), this was done: even though the 
defendant's past conviction was improperly admitted under Rule 
609(a)(2), it was held properly admitted under Rules 404 and 403, 
803 P.2d at 295-96. Further, here, as in Morrell, id. at 295, 
defendant's prior convictions constituted necessary substantive 
evidence of defendant's criminal intent, and were not merely 
evidence of a propensity to lie. Accordingly, Rules 404 and 403 
are more specifically applicable, and control this issue. See 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Utah App. 1990), and cases 
cited therein (where more than one provision might apply, the 
more specific provision governs the dispute). 
Even considering the merits of defendant's Rule 609 
argument, it should be rejected- First, defendant's prior 
conviction fit the seriousness and recency requirements of Rule 
609(a)(1) and (b). Next, defendant testified at trial, and 
professed unawareness that his wife was selling drugs during the 
December 1990 trips to Woody's bar (T. 2/28/90 at 245-46). 
Further, defendant attacked the State's key witness, the 
informant P.H., with his own history of drug abuse and his 
alleged failure to pay rent on his living quarters, arguing that 
11 
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P.H.'s testimony was not credible (T. 2/27/92 at 107-110; T. 
2/28/92 at 291-92). 
Construing Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, dealing 
with the impeachment use of other bad acts not resulting in 
convictions, this Court squarely held that a criminal defendant 
cannot attack the character of prosecution witnesses and 
simultaneously expect that he or she will be immune from such 
attacks. This, the Court observed, "would be a mockery of our 
justice system . . .." State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
The foregoing principle in Reed, relying on Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court's precedent, properly applies to 
Rule 609 admission of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. 
Rule 609(a)(1) contains a "probative versus prejudicial effect" 
weighing requirement that appears more defendant-favorable than 
that of Rule 403. However, this requirement should be construed 
to allow a weighing in favor of admissibility, when a defendant 
assails the State's witnesses as untruthful. Reed suggests this 
is a matter of fairness, and it is legitimately so. Defendant 
here attacked the credibility of the State's key witness. It is 
reasonable to hold that he thereby opened the door to his own 
impeachment, to the effect that his disclaimer of participation 
in his wife's drug sales was itself incredible. 
B* Proper Admission of Later Bad Act. 
Defendant also complains of error in the admission, 
through the testimony of P.H., of evidence that some time after 
12 
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the December 1990 methamphetamine sales in question, defendant 
"dunned" P.H. for payment of a later-accrued drug debt. This 
evidence, too, was admissible under Rule 404(b). 
It does not matter that the "dunning" incident occurred 
after the December 1990 drug transactions for which defendant was 
tried. In United States v. Bibo-Rodricruez, 922 F.2d 1398 (9th 
Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2861 (1991), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed 
that federal Rule 404(b), identical to the Utah provision, deals 
with "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" (emphasis added), without 
regard to whether such acts occurred prior to or after the acts 
constituting the charges in issue, 922 F.2d at 1400.3 Thus 
Bibo-Rodriguez's admissions to drug transportation, engaged in 
after the incident for which he was at trial, were held properly 
admissible against him, id. at 1401-02. 
A virtually identical situation is presented here. 
Defendant denied involvement in his wife's drug dealing, 
portraying himself as an "innocent dupe," as did Bibo-Rodriguez, 
922 F.2d at 1400 (T. 2/28/90 at 245-46). His attempt to collect 
a drug debt for his wife squarely contradicts this, showing his 
complicity in her criminal conduct. Again, because it was 
relevant to defendant's liability as an accomplice, this episode 
was properly revealed at his trial. 
interpretations of federal rules are persuasive authority for 
construing identical Utah rules. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1333-34 (Utah 1986). 
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Defendant's defense theory centered on his purported 
unawareness of his wife's criminal activity, even in his very 
presence. That defense theory legitimately allowed the State to 
introduce evidence of other acts tending to refute it. State v. 
Brown. 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978) ("The very nature of 
defendant's theory of the case points out that his contention of 
error is without merit"); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1165 
(Utah 1980) (other acts need not themselves be criminal). The 
trial court did not err in so ruling. 
POINT TWO 
THE "OTHER BAD ACTS" EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT DEFENDANT'S SECOND TRIAL, EVEN 
THOUGH IT HAD BEEN BARRED AT THE FIRST TRIAL. 
Defendant next argues that the "other bad acts" 
evidence should have been inadmissible under the "law of the 
case" doctrine, because the judge who presided over the first, 
joint trial refused to admit them. That isf the judge at his 
second trial lacked power to "overrule" the first judge's 
decision. This argument fails. 
A. Inapplicability of "Law of the Case" Doctrine. 
First of all, defendant relies too much on the "law of 
the case" doctrine. The term most commonly applies to legal 
issues in a given case that have been decided on appeal: those 
issues generally will not be redecided if the case, after remand, 
is again appealed. Further, the doctrine is a rule of general 
policy, not on the compelling level of res judicata or stare 
decisis. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 744 (1962). Accord 
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Conder v, A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987) 
(refusing to revisit prior Utah Supreme Court ruling in same case 
on "law of the case" ground, but citing authority, id. at 636, 
that doctrine is not "an inexorable command"). 
Even where "law of the case" describes the rule that 
one judge will not overrule the decision of another, co-equal 
judge in the same case, see State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 
(Utah 1989), the rule is one of general guidance only/ It is 
subject to a variety of exceptions, falling under the general 
rubric of a change in "relevant circumstances" following the 
earlier judge's ruling. Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129. In fact, the 
"law of the case" doctrine generally insulates an earlier judge's 
ruling from reconsideration by a second judge only if no such 
change in circumstances occurs. See, e.g., Sittner v. Big Horn 
Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 1984) (second judge was 
presented with no new evidence to justify changing first judge's 
decision); State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 (Utah 1982) (second judge's 
order reversed because, independent of "law of the case," it was 
legally erroneous); State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225 (Utah 1974) 
(second judge's order reversed because first judge's order, then 
pending on appeal, was held to be legally correct). 
Indeed, in Lamper, the Utah Supreme Court held that it 
was error for a second district court judge, citing "law of the 
4Indeed, the doctrine has been described as an advisory rule 
in the federal courts. E.g., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 13, 17-20 (1974) ("the 
general rule is more properly expressed in such terms as that a 
judge should not overrule or reconsider the previous decision or 
order of another judge" (emphasis in original)). 
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case," to not reconsider a prior judge's evidentiary ruling in 
the same case, 779 P.2d at 1129- The law had changed since the 
prior ruling, trumping the Mlaw of the case," Id. Further, this 
Court has noted that the "law of the case" doctrine, applied in 
the unyielding manner advocated by defendant, would improperly 
prevent trial courts from correcting their own errors. State v. 
Willard, 801 P.2d 189, 190 n.l (Utah App. 1990). Accord Griffin 
v. Dana Point Condominium Ass'n, 768 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (N.D. 
111. 1991) ("The law of the case does not demand obsequiousness 
right or wrong" (quoting authorities)). 
In sum, the "law of the case" doctrine does not bar 
reconsideration of legal rulings during the pendency of a case; 
indeed, the sound exercise of discretion sometimes requires such 
reconsideration. Just as the same judge may properly reconsider 
his or her earlier rulings, a subsequent judge in the same case 
should also be allowed to do so. 
B. Chanced Circumstances Justifying New Ruling. 
Here changed circumstances supported the second trial 
judge in admitting the "other bad acts" evidence against 
defendant. One such circumstance was the fact that defendant, 
previously given a mistrial, was facing an entirely new trial. 
In a very real sense, then, the earlier ruling barring this 
evidence was not even a part of the case in defendant's second 
trial: that ruling was binding only upon the joint trial, which 
had been concluded. Further, prejudice to defendant's wife, no 
longer a co-defendant, was not a concern at the second trial. 
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The State made this point when it sought to introduce the other 
bad acts at the second trial (R. 131-32). 
A second changed circumstance, also shown by the State, 
was the lack of full briefing of the "other bad acts" question 
before the first, joint trial. Defendant's motion to bar that 
evidence was only presented on the first day of that trial; the 
State was unable to fully research the issue (R. 69-73, 129-30). 
In fact, defendant's motion was untimely under Rule 12(b)(2), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (motions on admissibility of 
evidence must be made at least five days before trial): he 
received a "gift" when the judge even considered it. Further, as 
set forth in Point One, it can be argued that the first judge 
erroneously barred the evidence. It was therefore certainly 
proper, upon the State's timely motion, and full briefing by both 
parties, to admit the "other bad acts" evidence at defendant's 
second trial. 
No rational legal principle entitled defendant to 
preserve, to his benefit, a questionable legal ruling made at his 
first trial. The "law of the case" doctrine does not compel such 
a result, and the "other bad acts" evidence against defendant was 
properly admitted at his second trial. 
POINT THREE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE JUDGE AT 
HIS SECOND TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
Defendant finally complains that the judge who presided 
at his second trial should have been disqualified, and that the 
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first trial judge should have presided over the second trial as 
well.5 This complaint fails. 
First, defendant's disqualification motion was 
procedurally inadequate. He did not allege that the second trial 
judge was biased, much less file an affidavit to that effect, as 
required under Rule 29(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He 
raised no "colorable claim" that the second judge should have 
been recused for bias, see State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 
(Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988). 
Accordingly, that judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing 
to disqualify himself. See State v. Ontiveros, 189 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. June 22, 1992) (judge recusal motions 
reviewed for abuse of discretion). Defendant's disqualification 
motion was no more than an attempted intrusion upon the authority 
of the district court's presiding judge to assign cases as he or 
she sees fit. See Rule 3-104 (3)(E)(ii), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. It was properly rejected by the trial court. 
Defendant's analogy to substitution of counsel, while 
creative, is wide of the mark. Counsel, of course, acts as an 
advocate, seeking at every turn to achieve ei favorable trial 
outcome for the client. The judge's duty is to preside 
impartially over the matter, serving the truthfinding process, 
not necessarily to the benefit of either party. In short, 
5The first trial judge was Judge Halliday, then a circuit 
court judge temporarily assigned to the district court because of 
Judge Bunnell's unavailability. Judge Halliday was appointed 
permanently to the district bench after the first trial, but Judge 
Bunnell presided over the second trial (R. 175-77). 
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defendant's interest in retaining the same advocate for his 
defense is far stronger than that in retaining a particular, 
neutral judge. Rules governing changes in the former do not 
govern the latter. 
Further, even if defendant could retroactively apply 
Rule 29A, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to this case, it 
would not aid him. By its terms, the rule requires that "notice 
of change" of the trial judge be served on the court, not on the 
parties. Indeed, such notice is filed only when "all parties 
joined in the action . . . by unanimous agreement" decide to 
change judges. No such agreement occurred here. 
Finally, defendant was put on notice of the new judge 
assignment some three months before his second trial (R. 105). 
He did not protest that assignment until long after that judge 
granted the State's motion to admit the "other bad acts" evidence 
barred at the original trial (R. 159-60, 171-72). Defendant's 
belated disqualification motion thus looks suspiciously like an 
attempt to set aside an unfavorable evidentiary ruling, by 
replacing the judge who made it. If this is correct, defendant 
was "forum shopping," an enterprise the "law of the case" 
doctrine is designed to discourage. See 20 A.L.R. Federal 13, 
17-20 (1974) (discussing policy bases for "law of the case" 
rule). Accordingly, his judge disqualification motion was 
properly denied in the trial court, and that denial should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the trial jury found defendant 
guilty of criminal conduct, upon properly admitted evidence, 
before an impartial judge. Accordingly, his convictions should 
be affirmed. 
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